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Pricing in two-sided markets has not been fully understood yet. Especially, investigations of how 
competition in these markets affects the price structure or levels are still underway. This paper takes the 
payment card industry as an example of two-sided markets and examines whether two networks’ 
competition lowers one of the prices in the industry, merchant discount fees, and if it does, how much it 
lowers equilibrium merchant fees compared with the fee set by a monopoly network. If some cardholders 
hold only one card and the other cardholders hold two different cards, whether network competition 
lowers the fees and by how much the fees will be lowered depend on various factors, such as the share of 
multihoming cardholders in the total cardholder base, the merchants’ transactional benefit, each network’s 
net transactional benefit to its card users, the difference in the two networks’ cardholder bases, and the 
share of cardholders in the total customer base. Numerical examples with various parameter values 
suggest that typically, if the share of multihoming cardholders is less than 20 percent, networks can act as 
if they are monopolies; and if the share is around 50 percent, the average equilibrium merchant fee is 
reduced from the monopolistic merchant fee by as much as 25 percent. Numerical examples also suggest 
that a competing network has an incentive to set its cardholder fee lower than its rival’s cardholder fee. 
                                                 
1 Fumiko Hayashi is a senior economist in the Payments System Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, 925 Grand Boulevard, Kansas City, MO, 64198, e-mail:fumiko.hayashi@kc.frb.org. The views 
expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City or the Federal Reserve System.  1. Introduction 
Costs of accepting credit and debit cards for merchants have been increasing recently. In 
some countries, government regulations or agreements between government and involved 
entities restrict merchant fee levels to contain those costs.
2 In the United States, a different 
approach—encouraging competition among payment card networks—has been taken, rather than 
directly regulating fees. Recently, the U.S. court ruled that two major credit card networks, 
MasterCard and Visa, must allow their member financial institutions to issue their competitor 
networks’ credit cards, American Express and Discover. In another U.S. case that was settled out 
of court, MasterCard and Visa agreed to revoke their rules that had required merchants to honor 
both credit and signature-based debit cards. It may be too soon to evaluate these changes; 
however, since then, merchant fee levels have not declined and some networks charge merchants 
even higher fees.  
This paper examines whether network competition decreases merchant fees, and if it does 
how much it lowers equilibrium merchant fees compared with the fee set by a monopoly network. 
Some industry experts suspected that network competition in the United States actually raises 
merchant fees to compensate for lower (higher) cardholder fees (rebates) to card issuers. They 
view that networks compete for cardholders or their issuers rather than for merchants.
3 How 
networks attract consumers or card issuers is an interesting and important topic, but this paper 
does not directly analyze it. Instead, the paper seeks the highest merchant fees that competing 
networks would charge, given cardholder bases and cardholder fees. This approach eliminates 
the complication of modeling issuers’ network joining behavior and consumers’ cardholding 
behavior, together with the model of merchants’ card accepting behavior and networks’ 
                                                 
2 Those countries are including Australia, EU cross-border, Mexico, and Spain. 
3 See, for example, ATM&Debit News, and Card International. 
  2merchant fee setting; yet it allows us to see the effects of the changes in cardholder bases and/or 
cardholder fees on equilibrium merchant fees. This approach, however, is relevant only if the 
markets to which a single interchange fee applies are small enough so that the merchants’ card 
acceptance does not affect consumers’ cardholding. In the United States, typically interchange 
fees (and thus merchant fees) vary by industry. For instance, MasterCard and Visa set industry-
specific credit card interchange fees, such as general retail, hotel and car rental, restaurant, fuel 
dispenser, supermarket, warehouse club, and so on.
4 An industry-specific interchange fee, say a 
supermarket interchange fee, is less likely to be set by accounting for the effects of the 
supermarkets’ card acceptance on consumer cardholding. In most other countries, on the other 
hand, typically interchange fees do not vary by industry.
5 The network’s single interchange fee 
determines how many merchants in a nation accept its cards, which may greatly influence 
consumer cardholding. Therefore, the approach taken by this paper is relevant for U.S. markets 
but not for other countries’ markets.  
Several models of payment card markets have been developed to analyze the effect of 
network competition on price structure and/or price level. Some of the models, however, do not 
necessarily fit well with U.S. markets with respect to two important features. First, some models 
assume either that consumers hold at most one card, or that merchants accept at most one 
branded card, or both (Maneti and Somma (2002), Chakravorti and Roson (2006)). Many U.S. 
consumers hold more than one card and many U.S. merchants accept more than one branded 
card.
6,7 Second, some models assume that merchants do not have a strategic motive to accept 
                                                 
4 Visa USA and MasterCard International. 
5 For example, in Australia each credit card network sets two interchange rates. Interchange fees vary by how the 
transaction is processed. 
6 According to the BIS, the number of debit cards and credit cards issued in the United States in 2002 were 260.4 
million and 709 million, respectively. The U.S. population in the same year was 288.2 million.  
7 See, for example, the 2004 National Retail Census of Credit Cards. 
  3cards (Rochet and Tirole (2003), Chakravorti and Roson (2006)). However, U.S. industries are 
competitive and many merchants claim that they are afraid of losing customers by rejecting cards 
the customers prefer.
8 Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Guthrie and Wright (2003, 2006) satisfy 
these two important features—they assume that some cardholders and some merchants are 
multihoming and that merchants accept cards for strategic reasons. A main difference between 
them is that while consumer cardholding is exogenously given in Rochet and Tirole, it is 
endogenized in Guthrie and Wright. They found that if all cardholders hold at most one card and 
merchants accept cards for strategic reasons, network competition does not result in lower 
interchange fees (and thus merchant fees), and that if some cardholders hold more than one card, 
network competition may lower interchange fees.
9  
The model in this paper is built upon the model of Rochet and Tirole (2002). Because the 
paper focuses on analyzing U.S. markets, where interchange fees are set in a detailed manner 
according to industry category, the assumption of exogenously given consumer cardholding 
likely fits better than the assumption of endogenously determined consumer cardholding. Unlike 
Rochet and Tirole, which did not formally analyze the case where some cardholders hold more 
than one card, this paper analyzes that case in detail. This paper numerically calculates 
equilibrium merchant fees under various parameter values, compares equilibrium merchant fees 
with the fees set by monopolistic networks, and investigates what factors are critical for the 
difference between equilibrium merchant fees and monopolistically set fees. Four different cases 
are considered in turn: i) two networks’ cardholder bases and cardholder fees are symmetric; ii) 
two networks’ cardholder bases are asymmetric but their cardholder fees are symmetric; iii) two 
                                                 
8 See, for example, a recent merchant survey conducted by the Association for Financial Professionals.  
9 Guthrie and Wright (2006) also showed the cases where network competition may raise interchange fees. 
  4networks’ cardholder bases are symmetric but their cardholder fees are asymmetric; and iv) two 
networks’ cardholder bases and cardholder fees are asymmetric.  
Whether two competing networks lower merchant fees depends on several factors. 
Networks are less likely to decline merchant fees as i) the share of multihoming cardholders 
among the total cardholders gets smaller, ii) a cardholder’s net benefit gets larger, iii) a 
merchant’s gross benefit gets smaller, and iv) the share of cardholding customers in the total 
customer base gets larger. Whether the two networks’ cardholder bases and/or cardholder fees 
are symmetric also affects the equilibrium merchant fees. Generally, when multihoming 
cardholders are relatively scarce, competition between symmetric networks results in higher 
merchant fees than competition between asymmetric networks. When multihoming cardholders 
are relatively abundant, competition between asymmetric networks that have different cardholder 
fees may result in higher merchant fees.  
Numerical examples also allow us to conduct some experiments to see if a competing 
network has an incentive to set the cardholder fee lower. The results suggest that a network has 
an incentive to set its cardholder fee lower than its rival’s cardholder fee regardless of whether 
the network has the larger cardholder base, the smaller cardholder base, or the same cardholder 
base as its rival’s. How much lower the network’s cardholder fee should be depends on several 
factors.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. In Section 3 
equilibrium merchant fees of four different cases are presented in turn. Section 4 conducts some 
experiments and section 5 concludes.  
  52. The model 
In the model, only two payment instruments are available—cash and card. Card payments 
are provided by two competing networks: Network 1 and Network 2. Both networks’ cards, Card 
1 and Card 2, provide the same transactional benefits to the card users and the merchants who 
accept those cards; the transactional benefit to card users is to reduce their transactional costs 
associated with a cash transaction,  , to zero and the transactional benefit to merchants is to 
reduce their transactional costs associated with a cash transaction,  , to zero. These 
transactional costs associated with a cash transaction do not vary by each individual consumer or 
merchant but vary by industry.
c t
m t
10 A card transaction does not create other benefits for either 
merchants or card users.
11 Each network i charges a universal cardholder fee to the card user,  , 
and an industry-specific merchant fee to the merchant,  , per transaction.
i f
i m
12 For consumers, the 
true cost of purchasing a good or service is  c t p +  with cash and  i f p +  with Card i, where  p  is 
the product price charged by the merchant. For merchants, the true cost of selling a good or 
service is   with cash and   with Card i, where d  is the cost of selling a product 
regardless of the payment methods used for the transaction. To simplify the analysis, d  is 
assumed to be zero. 
m t d + i m d +
The model assumes that cardholder bases are exogenously given to the networks. This 
also implies that the merchants’ card acceptance in a given industry does not affect their 
customers’ cardholding behavior. Therefore, a fraction of customers,  i α , hold Card i in a given 
industry. Some consumers (a fraction of  0 ≥ σ ) are assumed to hold both cards (multihoming). 
                                                 
10 Rationale for this assumption, see Hayashi (2006).  
11 A credit card may create benefits other than transactional benefits to both card users and merchants. However, the 
paper focuses on industries where a credit card’s revolving function is less important. Those industries may include 
grocery stores, drug stores, gas stations, and quick service food restaurants. 
12 Obviously,   vary by industry.  i m
  6By definition, the total cardholding consumers in a given industry, α , must satisfy 
σ α α α − + = 2 1 , and the number of multihoming cardholders must be less than both the number 
 and the number of Card 2 holders, i.e.,  2 1, of Card 1 holders α α σ ≤ . 
Given the cardholder bases, each network sets  pe industry-s cific m rchant fees and a 
univers
ing against each other so that 
those m
e
al cardholder fees. Each network determines its cardholder fee first, and then determines 
industry-specific merchant fees. Thus, when determining an industry-specific merchant fee for a 
given industry, the network treats cardholder fees of its own and of its rival’s as given. A 
network is assumed to maximize its revenue from merchant fees.
13
The paper focuses on markets where merchants are compet
erchants have strategic motives to accept cards. We assume that aggregate consumer 
demand is price inelastic and two merchants, Merchant A and Merchant B, are competing 
according to the Hotelling model. Consumers (mass 1) are uniformly distributed on the interval 
of [0,1], which is independent of their cardholding. Merchant A is located at point 0, and 
Merchant B is located at point 1. For the consumer located at point x, where  1 0 ≤ ≤ x , the 
transportation cost to Merchant A is tx, and the transportation cost to  erchant  ) x M B is  1 ( t − . 
Merchants are required to set the same  roduct price for both card users and cash users. p
, accept 
Card 1
                                                
14
A merchant decides its card acceptance behavior from four choices: accept none
 only, accept Card 2 only, or accept both. If a merchant accepts both Card 1 and Card 2, 
multihoming cardholders use the card that gives them the higher net benefit (i.e., they use the 
card with the lower (higher) cardholder fee (rebate)). If a merchant accepts both cards, and if 
 
13 Equilibrium merchant fees under this assumption are likely lower than equilibrium merchant fees under the 
assumptions of profit maximizing. This is true if the cost per card transaction is higher than the cardholder fee, 
which is likely. 
14 This is due to the no surcharge rule imposed by card networks. 
  7both cards have the same cardholder fee (rebate), multihoming cardholders are assumed to 
randomly choose to use either card, thus half of them use Card 1 and half of them use Card 2.  
The timing of the game is as follows: 
(I)  Given cardholder fees, each payment card network sets industry-specific merchant fees. 
(II)  Each merchant decides whether to accept cards (neither, Card 1 only, Card 2 only, or both) 
and determines its product price. 
(III)  A consumer decides from which merchant he or she makes purchases and which payment 
method he or she uses (if a cardholder). 
Starting with stage (III), a cardholder is willing to use her card if the cardholder fee she 
pays to the network,   or  , does not exceed transactional costs associated with cash,  , since 
the merchant sets a unique product price for all of its customers. If the merchant accepts both 
cards, and if the consumer holds both cards, then she will use the card with the lower cardholder 
fee.  
1 f 2 f c t
Suppose  . At stage (II), the merchants decide whether to accept cards and 
determine the product prices. Suppose that both cards have been accepted in the industry for a 
long time. In such an industry, when a merchant decides its card acceptance behavior, it is likely 
that the merchant expects its rival will accept both cards.
2 1, f f tc >
15 Suppose that one of the merchants, 
say Merchant B, accepts both cards. Merchant A selects its card acceptance behavior from four 
choices: accepts both, accepts Card 1 only, accepts Card 2 only, or accepts neither. First, let us 
consider the case where Merchant A accepts both cards. Given Merchant B’s product price  , 
Merchant A’s profit function is defined as: 
B p
                                                 
15 See Hayashi (2006) for detailed discussion.  
  8(1) 
t
p p t
m p m p t p p
A B
A A m A A A 2
)} ) 1 ( )( ( ) )( ( ) 1 )( {(   ) ( 2 2 1 1
− +
− − − + − − + − − = σ ρ α ρσ α α π , 
where  ρ  depends  on   and  . When  1 f 2 f 2 1 f f = ,  5 . 0 = ρ ; when  ,  2 1 f f > 1 = ρ ; and when 
,  2 1 f f < 0 = ρ . Similarly, Merchant B’s profit function is defined. Equilibrium product prices 
are: 
(2)  2 2 1 1 ) ) 1 ( ( ) ( ) 1 ( m m t t p p m B A σ ρ α ρσ α α − − + − + − + = = . 
Merchant A’s profit is: 
(3) 
2
both) : both; : (
t
B A A = π . 
Second let us consider the case where Merchant A accepts neither card. Merchant A’s 
profit function is defined as: 
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  9where   (=  ) and   (= 
m m1 1 f t t c m − +
m m2 2 f t t c m − + ) are the merchant fees if each of the networks 
sets its merchant fee monopolistically. From equations 3 and 8, if Merchant B accepts both cards, 
Merchant A is better off by accepting both cards than by rejecting both cards, as long as each of 
the networks sets its merchant fee lower than the fee set by a monopoly network.  
Lastly, let us consider the case where Merchant A accepts either Card 1 or Card 2. 
Merchant A’s profit function by accepting only Card i (i=1 or 2) depends on   and   (j ≠ i).   i f j f
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Equilibrium prices are given when  j i f f <  
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Merchant A’s profit is therefore given when  j i f f < ,  
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Suppose both networks set their merchant fees lower than the monopoly fees (i.e., 
 and  ). Given that Merchant B accepts both cards, Merchant A accepts only 
one card if and only if: 
m m m 1 1 ≤
m m m 2 2 ≤
(23)  .
2
both) : both; : ( both)} : 2;   Card : (   both), : 1;   Card : ( { Max
t
B A B A B A A A A = >π π π  
At stage (I), each network sets its merchant fee, given its rival network’s merchant fee, 
and both networks’ cardholder bases and cardholder fees. Given Network 2’s merchant fee,  , 
Network 1 has two strategies: 1) “undercuts” and 2) prevents Network 2 from “undercutting.”
2 m
16 
Network 1’s “undercut” achieves if one of the two merchants accepts Card 1 only. By 
undercutting, Network 1 may be able to increase its market share in terms of the number of 
transactions. Denote   as the Network 1’s reaction function when Network 1 undercuts given 
, i.e., 
1 G
2 m ) ( 2 1 1 m G m = , and denote   as the Network 1’s reaction function when Network 1 
prevents Network 2 from undercutting given  , i.e., 
1 g
2 m ) ( 2 1 1 m g m = . Similarly, Network 2 has 
two strategies. Denote   and   as Network 2’s reaction functions.   2 G 2 g
Equilibrium merchant fees ( , ) are defined as follows: First, neither network can 





(24)  ,  ) ), ( ( ) , (
* * * *
j j i i j i i m m G E m m E ≥
                                                 
16 Actually, there is another strategy for Network 1: it can allow Network 2 to undercut at the merchant fee of m2. 
However, this strategy is always inferior to the strategy that prevents Network 2 from undercutting. 
  12where   is the earning function of Network i (i=1, 2). Second, given its rival’s merchant fee, 
, Network i (i=1 or 2 or both) may be able to earn more by setting a merchant fee,  , 
that prevents its rival network from undercutting at  . However, if that is the case, its rival 
network should set its merchant fee at  to undercut and as a result Network i’s, 
earning should be lower than the equilibrium earning. This implies that if equation 25 holds: 
i E
*
j m ) (
*





j i j m g G
(25)  ,  ) , ( ) ), ( (
* * * *
j i i j j i i m m E m m g E ≥
then, equations 26 and 27 must hold. 
(26)  ,  )) ( , ( )) ( )), ( ( (
* * * *
j i j j j i j i j j m g m E m g m g G E ≥
(27)  .  ) , ( ))) ( ( ), ( (
* * * *
j i i j i j j i i m m E m g G m g E ≤
3. Competition between two card networks 
Due to the complexity of the model developed in the previous section, general analytical 
results cannot be easily obtained. This section, therefore, presents numerical examples in order to 
answer the following two questions: 1) for what parameter values do competing networks set 
their merchant fees lower than the monopolistic level of fees?; and 2) if they set lower merchant 
fees, how much lower are equilibrium merchant fees? Numerical examples are grouped into four 
cases; case (i) two networks’ cardholder bases and cardholder fees are symmetric; case (ii) two 
networks’ cardholder bases are asymmetric but their cardholder fees are symmetric; case (iii) 
two networks’ cardholder bases are symmetric but their cardholder fees are asymmetric; and case 
(iv) two networks’ cardholder bases and cardholder fees are asymmetric.  
In the numerical examples, the following variables are treated as parameters.  
α :   share of cardholding customers in the total customer base, 
  13α σ / :  share of multihoming cardholders in the total cardholding customer base, 
m t :   a merchant’s transactional benefit relative to t, (merchant’s markup per transaction), 
i c f t − : Network i’s (i=1, 2) card user’s net transactional benefit relative to t. 
3.1 Symmetric in both cardholder bases and cardholder fees 
This subsection considers the cases where both networks’ cardholder bases are the same 
( 2 1 α α = ) and cardholder fees are the same ( f f f = = 2 1 ). In these cases, equilibrium merchant 




1 m m m = =
To answer the first question, chart 1 shows parameter values for which card network 
competition  does not lower merchant fees. In the chart, given  f tc −  and  α , for any 
combinations of   and  m t α σ /   which fall into the colored areas, competing networks set 
merchant fees as if they were monopolies. The three panels are different levels of   (Panel 
1:  =0.1, Panel 2:  =0.5, Panel 3: 
f tc −
f tc − f tc − f tc − =1), and each panel shows different levels of 
α  (=0.5, 0.75, and 1). 
All four parameters,  α σ / ,  ,  m t f tc − , and α , influence equilibrium merchant fees. As 
Rochet and Tirole (2002) found, when all cardholders are singlehoming ( 0 / = α σ ) competing 
networks do not lower merchant fees from the monopolistic fee, and when all cardholders are 
multihoming ( 1 / = α σ ) competing networks do lower merchant fees, regardless of the other 
parameter values. When some cardholders are singlehoming and some are multihoming, whether 
competing networks set lower merchant fees depends on the other three parameters ( , m t f tc − , 
and α ). 
Given   and  f tc − α , as a merchant transactional benefit ( ) increases, the threshold  m t
α σ /  at which competing networks start setting lower merchant fees declines. For example, 
  14f c − =0.5 and  t α = .5, the threshold  when  0 α σ /   is about 0.4 when  m t =0 and the threshold 
α σ /  declines to 0.1 as  m t  increases to 2. Given  f tc −  and  m t , as the share of cardholding 
custom  the total c stomer base ( ers in u α ) increases, the threshold  α σ / creases. For instance, 
f tc − =1 and  m t =1, the threshold 
 in
when  α σ /  increases from 0 , 0.38 to 0.41 as  .33 α  increases 
from 0.5, 0.75 to 1. Given α  and  m t , as a card user’s net transactional benefit ( f tc − ) increases, 
the threshold  α σ /   creases. For example, when  m t =1 and  in α =0.75, the threshold  α σ /  
increases from 0.05, 0.22 to .38 a f tc  0 s  −  increases from 0.1, 0.5 to 1.  
With a  er  m t , a smaller  f tc great − , and a s aller  m α , a relatively smaller shar  
multihoming cardholders among the total cardholders makes competing
e of
 netw merchant 
fees l
orks set 
ower than the fee s by a monopo en  m t  is greater, a monopoly network can charge a 
higher merchant fee because the greater the merchant transactional benefit from a card payment 
( m t ), the higher the merchant’s willingness to pay or the card payment. A competing network, 
on the other hand, has an incentive to set the merchant fee lower than the monopolistic level of 
fee. By doing so, it may increase the market share of the network in terms of the transaction 
volume if at least one merchant rejects the other network’s card. Although lowering the merchant 
fee reduces the network’s per transaction markup, the increased market share compensates for 
the loss from reduced markups. When a card user’s net transactional benefit from a card payment 
( f tc − ) is smaller, a merchant is more likely to reject one of the two cards. In order to retain as 
many customers as possible who hold only one card that is rejected by the merchant, the 
m nt needs to lower its price to compensate those card customers for their benefit losses. 
Because  f tc −  is small, a relatively small decrease in price set by the merchant is enough to 
compensate for the card customers’ losses. For a given share of multihoming cardholders among 
et  ly. Wh
 f
ercha
  15the total cardholders ( α σ / ), the smaller the share of cardholding customers in the total customer 
base (α ), the more likely the merchant is to reject the one brand of cards with the higher 
merchant fee. This is b se the customer base the merchant will lose by rejecting the cards is 
relative  small. However, compared with the other parameters, the effect of 
ecau
ly α   is not very 
significant. 
Next, equilibrium merchant fees ( * m ) are shown in charts 2, 3, and 4. Charts 2 and 3 
show the effects of  and   merchant fee and chart 4 sho s the effects 
of 
  m t f tc −  on the equilibrium w
α . From these charts, one can see that for any combinations of  m t ,  f tc − , and α , the 
equilibrium merchant fees decline monotonically as  α σ / , the share of multihoming cardholders 
am g the total cardholders, increases. When all cardholders are single m 0 / on ho ing ( = α σ ), the 
equilibrium merchant fee ( * m ) is the same as the fee set by a monopoly network (
m m ) 
regardless of the other parameter values. When all cardholders hold both cards ( 1 / = α σ ), both 
networks set merchant fees as low as possible. Since each network is assumed to maximiz s 
revenue from the merchants, the lowest merchant fee it would charge is zero. T 0
e it
hus,  *= m  at 
1 / = α σ . 
When some cardholders are multihoming ( 1 / 0 < < α σ ), equilibrium merch es  ant fe
depend on all four parameters. Chart 2 shows the effects of  (panels 1 and 2), and of  m t   f tc −  
(panels ee. Fro an  3 and 4) on the actual level of the merchant f els 1 and 2, given  f tc m p − , α , 
and  α σ / , a smaller transactional benefit to the merchant ( m t ) likely makes equili
merchant fee lower. From panels 3 and 4, given  m t , 
brium 
α , and  α σ / , a smaller net transactional 
benefit to the card user ( f tc − ) makes equilibrium merchant fee l er.   ow
  16Because a smaller  m t   or a smaller  f tc −   a o 
riu r a smaller 
ls makes the monopolistic merchant fee 
lower, the lower equilib merchant fee resulted from a smaller  m t  o m  f tc −  does 
not necessarily imply that competing networks duce their fees by a large amount. Chart 3 
shows the equilibrium merchant fee as a percentage of the monopolistic merchant fee. Panels 1 
through 4 in chart 3 correspond to panels 1 through 4 in chart 2, respectively. From panels 1 and 
2, with a smaller  m t , the ratio of the equilibrium merchant fee to the monopolistic merchant fee 
tends to be higher (or at least as high) for all ranges of 
 re
α σ / . Interestingly, a smaller merchant 
transactional benefit from a card payment makes the equilibrium merchant fee itself lower, but it 
makes the ratio of the equilibrium merchant fee to the m
contrast with  m t , the effects of  f tc
onopolistic fee tend to be higher. In 
−   on the ratio of the equilibrium merchant fee to the 
monopolistic merchant fee is not very clear. From panels 3 and 4, for a relatively smaller  α σ /  
( 2 . 0 / 0 < < α σ ), the smaller the card user’s net transactional benefit ( f tc − ), the smaller the 
ratio is; however this is changed around  α σ / =0.5; and for a relatively greater  α σ /  
( 1 / 6 . 0 < < α σ ), the smaller the  f tc − , the greater the ratio is. 
Although there are some variations, for most parameter values, when the shar f 
m ardholders in the cardholder base is arou
e o
ultihoming c  total  nd 50 percent the equilibrium 
merchant fees will be reduced by as much as 25% of the merchant fee set by a monopoly 
network. When the share of multihoming cardholders increases to 70 percent the equilibrium 
merchant fees will be reduced by as much as 50%.  
Chart 4 shows the effects of α , the share of cardholding customers in the total customer 
base. As panel 1 shows, α  has no effects on equilibrium merchant fees ( ) when  * m f tc − =0. 
For  > 0, a greater  f tc − α  makes  higher when  is close to zero (panel 2). However, when    * m m t  
  17f tc − > 0 and  m t is large enough, a greater α  makes  * m  higher for a small  α σ /  but a greater 
α  likely makes  * m  lower for a large    α σ /  (panel 3).  
Observations (Symmetric cardholder bases and cardholder fees): 
th a grea r share of multihoming cardholders among the total cardholders ( (a) Wi te α σ / ), a 
greater transactional benefit to the merchant ( m t ), a smaller net transac e 
rs in the total customer base 
tional benefit to th
card user ( f tc − ), and a smaller share of cardholding custome
(α ), competing networks are more likely to set their merchant fees lower than the fee set by 
a monopoly network.  
The equilib erchant fee set by the competing networks is likely lower with a greater  (b)  m rium 
σ /α , a smaller  m t , and a smaller  f tc − . 
 Asymmetric in cardh 3.2 older base mmetric in cardholder fees 
different
s and sy
In this subsection, we consider the cases where the two networks’ cardholder bases are 
 ( 2 1 α α ≠ ),  ut their cardhol es f f f = = 2 1 b der fe  are the same ( ). Without loss of 
generality, we assume that Network 1’s cardholder base is greater than Network 2’s ( 2 1 α α > ). 
Define c as the ratio of Network 2’s cardholder base to Network 1’s cardholder base ( 1 2 α α c = , 













α , respectively. Because multihoming cardholders cannot exceed the smaller 
network’s cardholder base, ( 2 α σ ≤ ), the share of multihoming cardholders in the total 
cardholder base ( α σ / ) should be equal to or less than  . At equilibrium, both merchants accept 
both cards, but 
c




1 m m ≠ ). 
  18From chart 5, one can see that whether network competition differs equilibrium merchant 
fees from a monopoly-set merchant fee depends on c . Colored areas in chart 5 are combinations 
of  m t  and  α σ /  for which equilibrium merchant fees are the same as monopo es, listic fe  given a 
n combi ation of c ,α , and  f tc − . The three panels are different levels of  f tc −  (Panel  1: 
f tc − =0.1, Panel 2:  f tc − =0.5, and Panel 3:  f tc − =1) and each panel shows different level of 
c ( .5, 0 d 1). For all three panels,  =0 .7, an α  is assumed to be 0.75. As c  gets smaller, colored 
areas shrink. Thi m e two networks’ cardholder bases diverge, either one or both 
kely to set their mer fees lower than the fee set by a monopoly. 
c   is more influential as the card user’s net transactional benefit ( f tc
s  eans that as th
of the networks are m re li




Because of the asymmetry in cardholder bases, the equilibrium merchant fees set by 
Networks 1 and 2 are likely different. When the share of multihoming cardholders amo e  ng th
total cardholders ( α σ / ) is large enough, the larger network (Network 1) sets a higher merchant 
fee tha
* n the smaller network i.e.,  2 1 m m > . When 
* α σ /  is small enough, both networks do not 
have an incentive to undercut, and therefore both networks set merchant fees at the monopolistic 
fee level. In this case, the equilibrium merchant fees set by Networks 1 and 2 are the same 
) ( 2 1 m m m = = . When 
* * m α σ /  is in dle range  smaller network sets a higher merchant 




1 m m < . In this range of 
 the mid , the
α σ / , the larger network has no 
incentive to lower merchant fees while the smaller network has an incentive to do so. Then, the 
ets a low erchant fee to prevent its smaller counterpart from undercutting. 
Given the lower merchant fee set by the larger network, the s
larger network s er m
maller network chooses not to 
undercut.  
  19Chart 6 shows the average equilibrium merchant fees. Given  α σ / , the average 
equilibrium merchant fee under competition between two networks whose cardholder bases are 
different (c =0.5, 0.7) is typically lower than the equilibrium me petition 
betwee
it
rchant fee under com
n two symmetric networks (c =1). As the two networks’ cardholder bases diverge (c  
gets smaller), the average equilibrium merchant fees are likely lower.  
Although asymmetry in the networks’ cardholder bases makes average equilibrium 
merchant fees lower, the upper lim  of  α σ /  created by the asymmetry keeps the minimu  
possible merchant fees high. For example, when  m t =1,  f tc
m
− =1, and α =0.75 (panel 1 of chart 
6), the 
Observations (Asymmetric cardholder bases and symmetric cardholder fees): 
(c) As the two competing networks’ cardholder bases diverge, either one or both of the networks 
are more likely to set their merchant fees lower than the fee set by a monopoly network.  
minimum possible (average) merchant fee in the case of c=1 is 0, but 0.92 or 1.32 in the 
case of c=0.7 or 0.5. 
(d) Given a combination of parameters,  α σ / ,  m t, f tc − , and α , the average equilibrium 
ibriu
3.3 Symmetric in cardholder bases and asymmetric in cardholder fees 
the sam
merchant fee set by the competing networks with asymmetric cardholder bases is likely lower 
than that set by the competing networks with symmetric cardholder bases. 
(e) The minimum possible average equil m merchant fee becomes higher as the two 
competing networks’ cardholder bases diverge. 
In this subsection, we consider the cases where the two networks’ cardholder bases are 
e ( 2 1 f f ≠ 2 1 α α = ), but their cardholder fees are different ( ). Without loss of generality, 
  20we assume that the Network 1’s cardholder fee is lower than the Network 2’s cardholder fee 
p
ne of  two merchants accepts only Card 1 while the other merchant accept both cards, 
Networ
alues. The equilibrium merchant fees are 
asymm
( 2 1 f f < ).  
By assum tion, multihoming cardholders use Card 2, only when the merchant they 
choose accepts only Card 2. Network 1, therefore, has no incentive to undercut because even if 
o the 
k 1’s market share in terms of number of transactions does not increase. Network 2, on 
the other hand, can increase its market share by undercutting. If increased market share can 
compensate for the reduced margin per transaction, Network 2 will undercut. For most parameter 
values, when at least one of the two merchants rejects Card 1 and accepts Card 2, the other 
merchant rejects Card 1. If that is the case, Network 1 will lose all of its transactions. To avoid 
that, Network 1 sets the merchant fee so that it can prevent Network 2 from undercutting. As a 
result, Network 2 does not undercut, rather it sets its merchant fee so that no merchants reject 
Card 2. For some parameter values, however, when one of the two merchants accepts only Card 
2, the other merchant still accepts Card 1. In such cases, Network 1 has two strategies to take—
one is to prevent Network 2 from undercutting and the other is to let Network 2 undercut. 
Although Network 1 can set a higher merchant fee when it lets Network 2 undercut, its revenue 
is always higher when it prevents Network 2 from undercutting. Thus, Network 1 always sets its 
merchant fee that discourages Network 2 to undercut. 
Unlike the previous two cases, one of the two networks (Network 1) has no incentive to 
undercut. Nevertheless, like the previous two cases, a unique equilibrium, at which both 





1 m m ≠ ).  
  21Chart 7 shows equilibrium merchant fees. Panels 1 and 2 show the merchant fee set by 
Network 1 w car 1 f tc − hen its  d user’s net transactional benefit ( ) is 0.5 and 1, respectively. 
Panels 3 and 4 show the merchant fee set by Network 2 when its card user’s net transactional 
benefit ( 2 f tc − ) is 0.5 and 0.1, respectively. The merchant fee set by Network 1 depends on the 
net transactional benefit of Network 2’s card users ( 2 f tc − ). Similar to the merchant fee set by 
Network 1, Network 2’s merchant fee also depends on the net transactional benefit of Network 
1’s card users. In each panel, a thick line represents the equilibrium merchant fees set under 
competition between two completely symmetric networks.  
As panels 1 and 2 show, for a given combination of  m t , α ,  1 f tc − , and  2 f tc − , the 
merchant fee set by Network 1 (
*
1 m ) declines as the share of mu ing cardholders among the 
total ca
ltihom
rdholders ( α σ / ) increases. When  α σ /  is relatively small, Netw hant 
fee lower than the fee set under symmetric competition, while when 
ork 1 sets its merc
α σ /  is relatively large, 
Network 1 sets its chant fee higher th e fee set under symmetric competition. When   mer an th
α σ /  is small, the lower the net transactional benefit provided by Network 2 ( 2 f tc − ), the lower 
the merchant fee set by Network 1 likely is. As  α σ /  increases, however, the order changes; 
  when α σ / =1, the lower the  2 f tc − , the higher the 
*
1 m  is.  
From panels 3 and 4, for a relatively smaller  α σ / , Network 2 raises its merchant fee 
(
*
2 m ) as  α σ /  increases;  afte σ α / ta el, Network 2 reduces  as    exceeds a cer in lev r   
*
2 m α σ /  
increas
om n. F f
es. The merchant fee set by Network 2 is at least as high as the fee set under symmetric 
c petitio or most range o   α σ / , the higher the card user’s net transactio l be
provided by Network 1 ( 1 f tc − ), the higher the equilibrium merchant fee set by Network 2 is. 
na nefit 
  22Charts 8 and 9 also show equilibrium merchant fees. In contrast with chart 7, in these two 
charts, both 
*
1 m  and 
*
2 m  are p sented in the same panel. From chart 8, one can see the effects  re of 
and m t    the effects of the difference between  1 f tc −  and  2 f tc −  on the equilibrium merchant fees. 
The effects of α  on the equilibrium merchant fees can be seen in chart 9.  
It may be somewhat counterintuitive that, under s ircumstances, the merchant fee set 
by Network 2, whose net transactional benefit to its card users is lower than
ome c




 total cardholders is higher. By comp ng panels 1 and 2 in chart 8, one can find that 
the hig
e merchant fee set by Network 1. As explained above, Network 1 cannot set its merchant 
fee to one that induces Network 2 to undercut. Since Network 1 wants to set its merchant fee as 
high as possible, Network 1 sets 
*
1 m  at this upper limit. Network 2, then sets its merchant fee at 
*
2 m , given 
*
1 m , so that no merchants reject its cards. As a result, for some parameter values, 
*
2 m  
exceeds 
*
1 m . Even when 
*
2 m m >  Network 2’s revenue is always lower than Network 1’s 
enue. 
It is more likely that   higher than 
*





2 m  
ari
her the merchant’s transactional benefit from a card payment ( m t ), the more likely the 
Network 2’s merchant fee (
*
2 m ) exceeds the Network 1’s merchant fee (
*
1 m ). Panels 1, 3 and 4 in 
chart 8 demonstrate that as the difference between  1 f tc −  and  2 f tc −  increases, the range of 








2 m m >  for 
2 . 0 / > α σ , while when  1 f tc −  is much higher than  2 f tc −  (pan
*
2 m  does not exceed 
*
1 m  
e entire rang
el 4), 
for th e of  α σ / . Chart 9 revea , as th e of cardholding custo the 
er base (
ls that e shar mers in 
total custom α ) in es, 
*
2 m  is more likely to exceed 
*
1 m .   creas
  23Chart 10 shows the average equilibrium merchant fees. Compared with the average 
equilibrium merchant fee when the two networks set the same c dho ar lder fees (i.e.,  f f f = = 2 1 ), 
even when Network 2 sets its cardholder fee higher (i.e.,  f f f = > 1 2 ), the average equilibrium 
merchant fee is higher for a large  α σ / . This means that when many cardholders are 
multihoming, if one of the two networks sets its cardholder fee higher than the other network, 
both the average equilibrium merchant fee and the average cardholder fee are higher. The more 
the two networks’ cardholder fees diverge, the higher the average equilibrium merchant fee will 
likely be for a large  α σ / . 
Observations (Symmetric cardholder bases and asymmetric cardholder fees): 
(f) As the two com ng peti  networks’ cardholder fees diverge, the network with the lower 
t by a monopoly 
(g) 
ork with the higher cardholder fee, if the share of 
cardholder fee is more likely to set its merchant fee lower than the fee se
network with the same cardholder fee.  
The equilibrium merchant fee set by the network with the lower cardholder fee is more likely 
to be higher than that set by the netw
multihoming cardholders among the total cardholders ( α σ / ) is smaller, the merchant’s 
transactional benefit ( m t ) is smaller, the difference between two network’s net transactional 
benefit to their card users ( 1 f tc −  and  2 f tc − ) is greater, and the share of cardholding 
customers in the total c tomer base ( us α ) is smaller.  
fee w mmetric cardholder fees tends to be higher 
than that with symmetric cardholder fe s when the sh
(h) The average equilibrium merchant  ith asy
e are of multihoming cardholders among 
the total cardholders ( α σ / ) is large. 
  243.4 Asymmetric in both cardholder bases and cardholder fees 
Finally, this subsection considers the cases where the two networks’ cardholder bases are 
erent ( 2 1 2 1 f f ≠ diff α α ≠ ) and ca lder fees ar rdho e also different ( ). Without loss of generality, 
ed to be lower than Network 2’s ( Network 1’s cardholder fee is assum 2 1 f f < ). Both cases where 
Network 1’s cardholder base is greater ( 2 1 α α > ) and where Network 2’s cardholder base is 
greater ( 2 1 α α < ) 
arame
 As exp
the merchant fee so that it can prevent Network 2 from undercutting, and given the merchant fee 
set by Network 1, Network 2 sets its merchant fee so that no merchants reject Card 2, in the case 
of asymmetric cardholder bases as well as asymmetric cardholder fees. 
Chart 11 shows equilibrium merchant fees. For a given combination of parameters,  , 
are considered. 
Like the previous three cases, a unique equilibrium exists for all p ter values. At 
equilibrium, both merchants accept both cards. lained in subsection 3.3, Network 1 sets 
tm
α ,  1 f tc − , and  2 f tc − , panel 1 shows the case where the two networks’ cardholder bases are 
symmetric ( 2 1 α α = ), panel 2 shows the case where the network with the lower cardholder fee 
(Network 1) has a greater cardholder base ( 1 2 1 5 . 0 α α α = > ), and panel 3 shows the case where 
e n rk with ower cardholder fee has a smaller cardholder base ( 1 2 1 2 th etwo  the l α α α = < ). The 
effects of the nce in cardholder bases on each network’s merchant fee are not very clear. 
However, the range of 
 differe
α σ / , which gives a m by Network 1 that is higher than  erchant fee set 
that by Network 2, expands, as the Network 1’s cardholder base gets smaller.  
Charts 12, 13 and 14 compare the average equilibrium merchant fee in the case where the 
two networks have asymmetric cardholder bases and asymmetric cardholder fees with the 
average equilibrium merchant fee in the other three cases—1) symmetric cardholder bases and 
  25asymm
cases where Network 1 has the 
greater
etric cardholder fees, 2) asymmetric cardholder bases and symmetric cardholder fees, and 
3) symmetric cardholder bases and symmetric cardholder fees.  
The effects of the difference in cardholder bases on the average equilibrium merchant fee 
can be seen in chart 12. Panel 1 shows the cases where Network 1 whose cardholder fee is the 
lower has the smaller cardholder base and panel 2 shows the 
 cardholder base. In each panel, a thick line represents the average equilibrium merchant 
fee where two networks have the same cardholder bases. Compared with the case where the two 
networks’ cardholder bases are identical, when Network 1’s cardholder base is smaller, the 
average equilibrium merchant fee is lower if the share of multihoming cardholders in the total 
cardholding customer base is small ( α σ / <0.5) but it may be higher if the share of multihoming 
cardholder is large ( α σ / >0.5). When Network 1’s cardholder base is greater, on the other hand, 
the average equilibrium merchant fee is higher for relatively small shares of multihoming 
cardholders ( α σ / <0.3) , but it is low r a relatively large  er fo α σ / . 
Chart 13 demonstrates the effects of the difference in cardholder fees on the average 
equilibrium merchant fee. Panels 1 and 2 are the case where the two networks’ net transactional 
benefits to their card users are close ( 8 . 0 1 = − f tc  and  7 . − f tc 0 2 = ) and panels 3 and 4 are the 
case where  1 f tc −  and  2 f tc −  are quite different ( 8 . 0 1 = − f tc  and  1 . 0 2 = − f tc ). A thick line 
in each panel represents the average equilibrium merchant fee where the two networks set the 
same lower cardholder fee (i.e.,  8 . 0 1 2 = − = − f t ). er case (panels 1 and 2), the 
average mer fee se he networks with as ikely lower than 
that set by the networks with symmetric cardholder fees. Only when Network 1’s cardholder 
base is the smaller, can the av e higher with asymmetric cardholder fees than 
with symmetric cardholder fee for large 
f tc c
ymmetric cardholder fees
erage merchant fee b
 In the form
chant  t by t  is l
α σ /  ( 5 . 0 / ≥ α σ ). In the latter case (panels 3 and 4), 
  26the average merchant fee can be higher with asymmetric cardholder fees for a large  α σ /  
regardless of which network’s cardholder base is the smaller.  
Chart 14 compares the average e ibrium hant fee in the case where the two 
networks are asymmetric in cardholder bases and cardholder fees with that in the case where the 
two networks are symmetric in cardholder bases and cardhold
quil  merc
er fees. Again, panels 1 and 2 are 
the case where the two networks’ net transactional benefits to their card users are close 
(8 . 0 1 = − f tc  and  7 . 0 2 = − f tc ) and panels 3 and 4 are the case where  1 f tc −  and  2 f tc −  are 
quite different ( 8 . 0 1 = − f tc  and  1 . 0 2 = − f tc ). A thick line in each panel represents the 
equilibrium merchant fee set by the two networks with symmetric cardholder bases and 
c s. Th erchant fee set by the networks with asymm ardho ses 
and cardholder fe her th  the networks with symmetric cardholder bases 
and fees only when the share of multihoming cardholders in the total cardholder base (
ardholder fee e average m etric c lder ba
es can be hig an that set by
α σ / ) is 
large enough. However, the minimum possible average equilibrium merchant fee set by the two 
asymmetric networks is always higher than the minimum possible equilibrium merchant fee set 
by the two symmetric networks.  
Observations (Asymmetric cardholder bases and cardholder fees): 
(i) The equilibrium merchant fee set by the network with the lower cardholder fee is more likely 
to be higher than that set by the network with the higher cardholder fee, if the network with 
ith symmetric cardholder bases 
and/or symmetric cardholder fees. 
the lower cardholder fee has the smaller cardholder base. 
(j) With some exceptions, the average equilibrium merchant fee set by the networks with 
asymmetric cardholder bases and asymmetric cardholder fees are likely lower than the 
average equilibrium merchant fee set by the networks w
  274. The network’s cardholder fee setting—some experiments 
This section carries out some experiments to examine whether the network has an 
entive to set a lower cardholder fee by using the results obtained in the previous section. As 
ntioned before, some industry exper
inc
me ts suspected that network competition in the United States 
actually raises merchant fees to compensate for lower cardholder fees (even negative) to card 
issuers. Since the model assumes that the networks are the card issuers, we examine if the 
network’s setting a lower cardholder fee generates enough revenue from merchant fees to 
compensate for the loss of revenue from the cardholder fee. Although changing the network’s 
cardholder fee likely affects the network’s cardholder base, such effects will appear rather slowly. 
Instead, it likely has an immediate effect on existing cardholder’s transactions—multihoming 
cardholders use the network’s card exclusively. Therefore, during the experiments, it is assumed 
that cardholder fees do not affect current cardholder bases. 
In this section, we do not seek to find equilibrium cardholder fees; instead, we calculate 
one of the two network’s net revenues in a given industry—revenue from the merchant fee minus 
loss from the decreased cardholder fee—given the other network’s cardholder fee and both 
networks’ cardholder bases. The other network’s cardholder fee is used as the base cardholder 
fee of the network. That means if the network sets the same cardholder fee as the other network’s, 
the loss from the cardholder fee is zero; if the network sets the cardholder fee lower than the 
other network’s, the difference between the two cardholder fees times the number of transactions 
used by the network cards is the loss; if the network sets the cardholder fee higher than the other 
network’s, the difference times the number of transactions used by the network cards is seen as 
the gain.  
  28First, let us consider the case where the two networks’ cardholder bases are the same. 
Table 1 reports Network 1’s net revenues when Network 2 sets its cardholder fee so that 
Network 2 2 f tc − ’s card users’ net transactional benefit ( ) is 0.5. Three panels in the table 
present the results under different parameter values of α , the share of cardholding customers in 
the total customer base, and  m t , a merchant’s transactional benefit from a card payment, because 
it is considered that these parameters greatly vary by industry. Panel 1 shows the case where 
α =0.75 and  m t =0.5, panel 2 shows the case where α =0.75 and  m t =1, and panel 3 shows the 
case where α =1 and t =0.5.
Whenever singlehoming and multihoming cardholders coexist ( 1 / 0 <
m   
< α σ ), Network 1 
n increase i  net revenue by setting its cardholder fee lower than Network 2’s cardholder fee. 
However, an  lower f s do no
ca ts
y ee t always increase the net revenue, com
when N
pared with the net revenue 
etwork 1 sets the same cardholder fee as Network 2’s. For example, in panel 1, when 
α σ / =0.8, if Network 1 sets its cardholder fees so that its card user’s net transactional benefit 
( 1 f tc − ) becomes 1, 0.9, or 0.6, then the network’s net revenue increases; if instead the network 
sets its cardholder fee so that  1 f tc − =0.7 or 0.8, then its net revenue decreases. Therefore, how 
 lower Network 1’s cardholder fee should be depends on the parameter values. Obviously 
Network 1 has no incentive to set its cardholder fee higher than Network 2’s cardholder fee.  
Next, let us consider the case where Network 1’s cardholder base is smaller than Network 
2’s. Table 2 presents Network 1’s net revenue given a card user’s net transactional benefit from 
Card 2 ( 2 f tc − ) is 0.5, the share of cardholding customer base (
much
α ) is 0.75, and a merchant 
transactional benefit from a card payment ( m t ) is 0.5. Panels 1, 2 and 3 show the cases where the 
ratio of Network 1’s cardholder base to Network 2’s cardholder base are 0.9, 0.7, and 0.5, 
  29respectively. Similar to symmetric cardholder bases, the network with the smaller cardholder 
base would set a lower cardholder fee than its rival’s cardholder fee. Again, how much lower the 
cardholder fee should be depends on parameter values.  
Finally, let us consider the case where Network 1’s cardholder base is larger than 
Network 2’s. Table 3 presents the results under the same parameter values as table 2 ( 2 f tc − =0.5, 




2  3 show the cases where the ratio of Network 1’s cardholder base to Network 2’s 
cardholder base are 1/0.9, 1/0.7, and 1/0.5, respectively. In contrast with the previous two cases, 
hen Net ork 1’s cardholder base is the larger, Network 1 can increase its net revenue by 
setting its cardholder fee higher than Network 2’s cardholder fee. For example, see in panel 2, 
when the share of multihoming cardholders among the total cardholders (
w
α σ / ) is 70 percent 
(that is, all Card 2 holders are multihoming). By setting its cardholder fee higher so that its card 
user’s net transactional benefit ( 1 f tc − ) becomes 0.1 or 0.2, Network 1’s net revenue is higher 
than it would be by setting its cardholder fee lower. However, such cases are rare and for most 
parameter values, Network 1 can increase its net revenue by setting the cardholder fee lower than 
Network 2’s. The network with the rger cardholder base will unlikely set its cardholder fee 
higher than its rival’s cardholder fee, even when its revenue increases by doing so. Setting a 
higher cardholder fee will not change the network’s cardholder base immediately, but it may 
The experiments in this section suggest that a network has an incentive to set its 
larger cardholder base, the smaller cardholder base, or the sam
 la
eventually affect the network’s cardholder base negatively.  
cardholder fee lower than its rival’s cardholder fee regardless of whether the network has the 
e cardholder base as its rival’s.  
  305. Con
rk 
competition does not lower merchant fees, while if some cardholders are multihoming then 
network competition likely lowers merchant fees. By using numerical examples with various 
parameter values, the paper explored what percentage of cardholders need to be multihoming so 
that competing networks lower merchant fees, and if they were to lower the fees then by how 
much the fees would be lowered. This study analyzed not only competition between symmetric 
networks but also asymmetric networks in terms of cardholder bases and cardholder fees. 
The results suggest that network competition does not necessarily lower merchant fees 
when merchants accept cards for strategic reasons. The share of multihoming cardholders among 
the total cardholders need to be large enough so that competing networks set lower merchant fees 
than the monopolistic merchant fee. For most parameter values, if the share of multihoming 
cardholders is less than 20 percent, networks can act as if they are monopolies. When the share 
of multihoming cardholders is around 50 percent, networks set lower merchant fees but the ratio 
of the equilibrium merchant fee to the monopolistic merchant fee is likely 0.75 or above. 
Asymmetric cardholder bases likely lower the average equilibrium merchant fees 
compared with those under competition between symmetric networks; however the upper limit 
of the share of multihoming cardholders in the total cardholder base is also created by the 
difference in the two networks’ cardholder bases, which keeps the minimum possible merchant 
fees high. Asymmetric cardholder fees typically make the average equilibrium merchant fees 
lower compared with symmetric cardholder fees when the share of multihoming cardholders is 
less than 50 percent, but those may make the average equilibrium merchant fees higher when the 
clusion 
This paper examined the effects of network competition on equilibrium merchant fees in 
detail. Previous literature suggested that if all cardholders hold at most one card then netwo
  31share of multihoming cardholders is greater than 50 percent. If, in the real world, competing 
networks’ cardholder bases are different significantly, the average equilibrium merchant fees 
cannot be much lower than the monopolistic merchant fee. If, instead, their cardholder bases are 
quite similar and the share of multihoming cardholders in the total cardholder base is large, but if 
their cardholder fees are different significantly, the average equilibrium merchant fees could be 
quite high.  
This paper also examined whether a competing network has an incentive to set a lower 
cardholder fee. The results suggest that regardless of whether the network has the larger 




k can increase its net revenue by setting the cardholder fee lower than its rival’s 
cardholder fee. Since lower cardholder fees likely make equilibrium merchant fees higher, the 
results may emphasize that network competition does not necessarily lower merchant fees. 
In the United States, more and more consumers hold payment cards. If this implies an 
increase in singlehoming cardholders, networks would not reduce their merchant fees. If, instead, 
this implies an increase in multihoming cardholders, if everything else has been the 
ks would lower their merchant fees. However, other parameters, such as the merchants’ 
transactional benefit and the card users’ net transactional benefit, have likely changed. It is 
difficult to measure the change in the merchants’ transactional benefit from a card, but if the 
benefit has declined then networks would be less likely to reduce their merchant fees from the 
monopolistic fee level. The card users’ net transactional benefit from a payment card has likely 
increased, which may allow networks to raise their merchant fees. Moreover, many card issuers 
offer rebates to their customers in order to make their cards be the most preferred cards. As a 
  32result, some cardholders act like singlehoming cardholders even though they actually hold 
multiple cards.  
The results obtained in this paper suggest that policies that simply encourage network 
competition may or may not lower merchant fees, depending on various factors, such as the 
merchants’ transactional benefit, each network’s net transactional benefit to its card users, the 
share of cardholders in the total customer base, the share of multihoming cardholders among the 
total cardholders, and each network’s cardholder base. More empirical research is necessary to 
evaluate the effectiveness of such policies.  
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  34Chart 1: Parameter values for which network competition does not lower merchant fees 
 








Panel 1: tc - f = 0.1
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  36Chart 3: Equilibrium merchant fees—symmetric cardholder bases and fees: 























































  37Chart 4: Equilibrium merchant fees: Effects of α 
 































  38Chart 5: Parameter values for which network competition does not lower merchant fees:  
Effects of c   (α=0.75) 
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  39Chart 6: Average equilibrium merchant fees—asymmetric cardholder bases: 
Effects of c   (α=0.75) 
 

































  40Chart 7: Equilibrium merchant fees—asymmetric cardholder fees 
(α=0.75, tm=0.5) 
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  41Chart 8: Equilibrium merchant fees—asymmetric cardholder fees: 
Effects of tm and difference between tc-f1 and tc-f2  (α=0.75) 
 























































  42Chart 9: Equilibrium merchant fees—asymmetric cardholder fees: 
Effects of α  (tm=0.5) 


































  43Chart 10: Average equilibrium merchant fees—asymmetric cardholder fees: 
(α=0.75, tm=0.5) 
 












































  44Chart 11: Equilibrium merchant fees—asymmetric cardholder bases and fees: 
(α=0.75, tm=0.5, tc-f1=0.8, tc-f2=0.4) 
 


































  45Chart 12: Average equilibrium merchant fees—asymmetric cardholder bases and fees: 
Effects of difference in cardholder bases 
(α=0.75, tm=0.5, tc-f1=0.8, tc-f2=0.4) 
 

























  46Chart 13: Average equilibrium merchant fees—asymmetric cardholder bases and fees: 
Effects of difference in cardholder fees 
(α=0.75, tm=0.5, tc-f1=0.8) 
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  47Chart 14: Average equilibrium merchant fees—asymmetric cardholder bases and fees: 
Effects of difference in cardholder bases and difference in cardholder fees 
(α=0.75, tm=0.5, tc-f1=0.8) 
 




















































  48Table 1: Network 1’s net revenue—symmetric cardholder bases 
( 2 f tc − =0.5) 
 
Panel 1: α =0.75,  =0.5  m t
   Share of multihoming cardholders in the total cardholding customer base 
Fee  Net benefit  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1 
  1  .375 .413 .432 .424 .394 .338 .282 .230 .176 .121 .068 
  0.9 .375  .413  .432  .424 .383 .332 .276 .217 .162 .107 .053 
Lower  0.8 .375  .413  .428  .424 .378 .326 .264 .210 .149 .093 .038 
  0.7 .375  .413  .428  .419 .373 .315 .258 .198 .135 .078 .023 
  0.6 .375  .413  .428  .414 .362 .309 .270 .261 .176 .093 .008 
Same  0.5 .375  .375  .375  .371 .330 .281 .225 .206 .154 .079 .000 
  0.4 .375  .338  .327  .288 .240 .193 .152 .111 .070 .033 .000 
Higher  0.3 .375  .338  .327  .282 .238 .194 .152 .111 .072 .035 .000 
  0.2 .375  .342  .317  .276 .235 .194 .153 .113 .075 .037 .000 
  0.1 .375  .346  .309  .269 .230 .191 .152 .114 .076 .038 .000 
 
Panel 2: α =0.75,  =1  m t
   Share of multihoming cardholders in the total cardholding customer base 
Fee  Net benefit  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1 
  1  .563 .619 .626 .600 .536 .467 .402 .332 .263 .200 .135 
  0.9 .563  .619  .626  .595 .525 .456 .384 .312 .243 .171 .105 
Lower  0.8 .563  .619  .626  .585 .520 .444 .372 .293 .223 .150 .082 
  0.7 .563  .619  .626  .580 .509 .456 .468 .383 .270 .164 .053 
  0.6 .563  .619  .626  .570 .515 .540 .450 .351 .243 .135 .023 
Same  0.5 .563  .563  .563  .518 .454 .401 .383 .296 .203 .101 .000 
  0.4 .563  .510  .479  .407 .341 .281 .215 .153 .096 .045 .000 
Higher  0.3 .563  .519  .471  .405 .339 .277 .220 .160 .103 .049 .000 
  0.2 .563  .523  .464  .402 .340 .280 .220 .163 .106 .052 .000 
  0.1 .563  .516  .457  .398 .340 .282 .224 .167 .110 .055 .000 
 
Panel 3: α =1,  =0.5  m t
   Share of multihoming cardholders in the total cardholding customer base 
Fee  Net benefit  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1 
  1  .500 .550 .588 .579 .560 .458 .360 .264 .171 .076 .000 
  0.9 .500  .550  .588  .579 .546 .443 .344 .255 .162 .124 .000 
Lower  0.8 .500  .550  .582  .572 .525 .435 .336 .272 .243 .114 .000 
  0.7 .500  .550  .582  .572 .511 .420 .352 .349 .225 .105 .000 
  0.6 .500  .550  .576  .572 .497 .405 .424 .323 .216 .105 .000 
Same  0.5 .500  .500  .500  .500 .450 .375 .295 .280 .195 .095 .000 
  0.4 .500  .450  .430  .397 .326 .262 .207 .145 .090 .041 .000 
Higher  0.3 .500  .450  .436  .386 .322 .260 .204 .151 .096 .046 .000 
  0.2 .500  .455  .432  .374 .316 .259 .204 .150 .098 .048 .000 
  0.1 .500  .461  .415  .362 .309 .256 .203 .151 .100 .050 .000 
 
  49Table 2: Network 1’s net revenue—the smaller cardholder base  
( 2 f tc − =0.5, α =0.75,  =0.5)  m t
 
Panel 1:  =0.9  c
   Share of multihoming cardholders in the total cardholding customer base 
Fee  Net benefit  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9 
  1 .355  .391  .409  .402 .378 .325 .273 .223 .173 .122 
  0.9  .355 .391 .409 .402 .368 .320 .267 .211 .160 .108 
Lower  0.8  .355 .391 .409 .402 .363 .309 .256 .199 .147 .095 
  0.7  .355 .391 .405 .402 .353 .304 .244 .187 .134 .081 
  0.6  .355 .391 .405 .393 .348 .293 .239 .236 .192 .068 
Same  0.5  .355 .353 .351 .346 .306 .256 .203 .171 .129 .057 
  0.4  .355 .316 .305 .261 .210 .162 .121 .077 .036 .000 
Higher  0.3  .355 .316 .302 .255 .209 .163 .120 .078 .038 .000 
  0.2  .355 .320 .293 .250 .206 .163 .121 .080 .039 .000 
  0.1  .355 .324 .285 .243 .202 .161 .120 .080 .040 .000 
 
Panel 2:  =0.7  c
  
Share of multihoming cardholders in the total cardholding 
customer base 
Fee  Net benefit  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7 
  1  .309 .340 .359 .349 .329 .283 .237 .194 
  0.9  .309 .340 .356 .349 .320 .278 .232 .184 
Lower  0.8  .309 .340 .356 .345 .316 .269 .222 .173 
  0.7  .309 .340 .356 .345 .311 .264 .212 .163 
  0.6  .309 .340 .352 .345 .303 .255 .203 .152 
Same  0.5  .309 .302 .296 .283 .246 .204 .167 .152 
  0.4  .309 .265 .251 .195 .141 .092 .044 .000 
Higher  0.3  .309 .270 .243 .191 .140 .091 .045 .000 
  0.2  .309 .274 .235 .187 .138 .091 .045 .000 
  0.1  .309 .274 .228 .182 .136 .090 .045 .000 
 
Panel 3:  =0.5  c
  
Share of multihoming cardholders in the total 
cardholding customer base 
Fee  Net benefit  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5 
  1 .250  .275  .288  .273 .249 .210 
  0.9 .250  .275  .288 .273 .245 .206 
Lower  0.8 .250  .275  .285 .273 .242 .203 
  0.7 .250  .275  .285 .273 .238 .195 
  0.6 .250  .275  .285 .273 .235 .191 
Same  0.5 .250  .238  .225 .202 .152 .116 
  0.4 .250  .206  .172 .111 .053 .000 
Higher  0.3 .250  .211  .166 .108 .053 .000 
  0.2 .250  .211  .161 .106 .052 .000 
  0.1 .250  .208  .156 .103 .051 .000 
 
  50Table 3: Network 1’s net revenue—the larger cardholder base  
( 2 f tc − =0.5, α =0.75,  =0.5)  m t
 
Panel 1: c=1/0.9 
   Share of multihoming cardholders in the total cardholding customer base 
Fee  Net benefit  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9 
  1 .395  .434  .455  .446 .409 .349 .291 .235 .171 .113 
  0.9  .395 .434 .450 .446 .398 .343 .284 .221 .163 .105 
Lower  0.8  .395 .434 .450 .446 .392 .332 .272 .208 .149 .090 
  0.7  .395 .434 .450 .436 .387 .326 .265 .208 .171 .075 
  0.6  .395 .434 .450 .431 .376 .320 .303 .248 .156 .068 
Same  0.5  .395 .397 .399 .397 .358 .308 .252 .229 .177 .099 
  0.4  .395 .359 .349 .315 .268 .223 .182 .144 .105 .066 
Higher  0.3  .395 .359 .349 .308 .266 .224 .183 .144 .106 .070 
  0.2  .395 .363 .341 .302 .263 .224 .185 .147 .110 .074 
  0.1  .395 .367 .333 .296 .258 .221 .184 .148 .111 .075 
 
Panel 2: c=1/0.7 
  
Share of multihoming cardholders in the total cardholding 
customer base 
Fee  Net benefit  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7 
  1  .441 .485 .498 .493 .426 .364 .296 .225 
  0.9  .441 .485 .498 .488 .420 .357 .282 .218 
Lower  0.8  .441 .485 .498 .476 .414 .344 .275 .210 
  0.7  .441 .485 .498 .470 .408 .338 .304 .195 
  0.6  .441 .485 .498 .465 .401 .357 .296 .188 
Same  0.5  .441 .448 .454 .456 .398 .323 .250 .219 
  0.4  .441 .410 .402 .377 .335 .294 .254 .215 
Higher  0.3  .441 .410 .402 .370 .332 .295 .258 .222 
  0.2  .441 .414 .398 .363 .329 .294 .260 .226 
  0.1  .441 .417 .398 .356 .324 .292 .259 .227 
 
Panel 3: c=1/0.5 
  
Share of multihoming cardholders in the total 
cardholding customer base 
Fee  Net benefit  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5 
  1 .500  .550  .558  .514 .434 .353 
  0.9 .500  .550  .558 .507 .427 .345 
Lower  0.8 .500  .550  .558 .501 .420 .338 
  0.7 .500  .550  .558 .494 .413 .330 
  0.6 .500  .550  .552 .488 .420 .323 
Same  0.5 .500  .513  .525 .505 .457 .405 
  0.4 .500  .475  .468 .451 .416 .379 
Higher  0.3 .500  .475  .471 .445 .414 .382 
  0.2 .500  .478  .467 .439 .410 .382 
  0.1 .500  .483  .459 .432 .406 .380 
 
  51